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fact of human impact on the environment (as humans have always had an
impact insofar as we have been "embedded in biological systems"), but
rather the unprecedented scale and pace of human impact.3
Questions of justice now unfurl on spatial and temporal scales at once
global and microscopic, immediate and spanning through the ages. Legal
and political concepts of causation and responsibility are complicated and
reconfigured by our growing awareness of the intergenerational
consequences of contemporary choices. In this context, the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable
Development ("Standing Committee") recently recommended that the
Government of Canada create "an advocate for Canada's future
generations."' The Standing Committee's report expressly cites growing
transnational

and

international

attention

to

the

demands

of

"intergenerational equity''. noting that various jurisdictions have
experimented with institutional committees or advocates for future
generations. 5 The challenges to such projects are daunting. How can we
know our obligations to future persons who do not yet exist, or may not
even come into being?6

!bid at 100.
House of Conunons, Standing Conunittee on Environment and Sustainable
Development, Fedeml Sustainabili~y for Future Generations - A Report Following an

Assessmmt of th1! Federal Sustainab/1! Development Act (June 2016) at 22, online:
< ourcommons.ca> IStanding Committee, Fedn-al Sustainability].
!bid at 23-24. For an overview of international and domestic legal commitments and
institutions for future generations, see lnte1generational Solidarity and the J.Veeds of'
Future Genemtions, UNGA OR, 68th Sess, Annex, Agenda item 19, UN Doc A/68/150
(2013) ax paras 32-48, online: <https://sustainabledevdopment.un.org/ concenc/
documents/ 2006futurc.pdf> [United Nations].
Note in particular the Standing Committee's observation that "future generations have
no voice in today's decision making that will ulrimarcly affect their interests": Standing
Conunirree, frderal Sustainability. supra note 4 at 22. 'l 'his concern that the interests of
voiceless future persons pose a challenge ford emocratic governance is a common theme
in intergenerational justice literature-much of v;rhich focuses on creating institutions
that might serve a representative function respecting future generations. For overviews
ofproposed institutional responses, see Michael Kates, "Justice, Democracy, and Future
Generations" (2015) 18:5 Crit Rev Inr'l Soc & Pol Phil 508; Philippe Van l'arijs, "The
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Edith Brown Weiss's foundational articulation of "intergenerational
equity" urges us to imagine char "each generation receives a natural and
cultural legacy in trust from previous generations and holds it in trust for
future generations."7 The concept, drawing on legal trusteeship, conjures a
series of distinct and identifiable "generations", linked to each other through
a chain of discrete transactions.s This analytic move-treating generations
as monoliths with separate, identifiable, and competing interests-is a
remarkable feature of the exploding body ofliterature on "intergenerational
justice" and "intergenerational equity."~ Intergenerational justice, on chis
account, is concerned with a "fundamentally different" problem from
intra-generational justice, which concerns disparities of circumstances,
resources, or interests within a given generation. These disparities have been
a central focus of the environmental justice movement, but have been given

Disenfranchisement of rhe Elderly, and Other Arremprs to Secure Inrergencrarional
Tustice" (1998) 27:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 292; Dennis F Thompson,
"Democracy in Time: Popular Sovereignty and' kmporal Representation" ( 200 S) 12: 2
Consrellarions 245.

Edith Brown \~'eiss, ln .F.tirness to Future Genemtions: lnternation..d Law, Common

Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equi~y (New York: 'lbnsnational Publishers, 1989)
at 2 [Brown \Vciss, In Fairness J.

In fact, Brown Weiss explicitly references legal-doctrinal articularions of common law
and civillaw trust doctrine in ha analysis. See ibid at 2, n 3; Edith Brown Weiss, "The
Planetary 'frust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity" (1984) 11:4 Ecology

LQ49S.
The terms "intergenerational justice" and "intergenerational equity" appear to be used

interchangeably in much of the literature. But see United Nations, supra note 5
(proposing that intergenerational justice is a broader concept in that it includes not only
distribution over time, but also "procedural, restorative, and retributive dimensions" at
para 10). \\le have preferred to use rhe term "inrergenerarional justice" in describing our
own project, because we think that it is more evocative of the "social justice" and
"environmental justice" traditions that inform our analysis-and because it avoids the
implication thar generations arc uni rs rhar may he subjecrs of"equity". Because we seek
to problematize

the treatment of"generations" as the relevant unit of analysis, it might
be even more precise to use a term like "intertemporal justice" (or even "intertemporal
rclarions'; to avoid rhc individualistic tenor of "jusrice" in some srrands of liberal

legalism), but we have instead elected "intergenerational justice" so as to keep this work
more directly in conversation witl1 the existing scholarship in this field.
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little if any attention by many scholars working under the banner of
intergenerational equity.I''

In order to conceive of intergenerational justice, conventional
constructions (which we will refer to as "the orthodox approach") resort to
rough averages across time, glossing over the vast disparities in how the
resources of the "trust" are distributed amongst the so-called "beneficiaries".

In order

to operationalize the concept, then, one must create an

aggregate measure of well-being rather than "analyse the various
circumstances and living conditions of individuals at a given point in
time." 11 The United Nations' influential Bnmddand Report of 1987,
following Brown Weiss,

adopted

a formulation

of "sustainable

development" that similarly flattens the vast social differences between
people inhabiting any given moment, calling for "development which meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs."" Critics remark that this approach
"reflects a concern with equity mainly in the inter-generational sense ....
[with J only a faint suggestion in the definition of concern for distributive
justice in the intra-generational sense". 1-1
10

This split parallels the division Harris observes between discourses of"social justice" and

"sustainability": Harris, supm note l at 104-05. See also Andrew Dobson's related
observation of a disconnect between discoursesof"justice" and "sustainability": Andrew
Dobson, "Introduction" in Andrew Dobson, ed, Fairness and Futurity: Essays rm

Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
11

12

Toerg Chet Tremmel, "Introduction" in Joerg Chet Tremmel, ed, Handbook of
lntergenerationaljustice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006) 1 at 5.
Report rfthe TVf1rld Commission rm Environment & D evelopment: Ou r Common Future,

UNWCEDOR, UN Doc A/42/427 (1987) at para 27.
M ichael McCluskey, "Emperor Has No Cloches: The Conundrum of Sustainable

Development" (1999) 9:2 Duke Envrl L & l'ol'y F 153 at 154. Sumudu Ataparru
observes that, not coincidentally, "[a]lthough it is not possible to generalize, Northern
countries tend to emphasize intergenerational equity, while Southern states tend to

emphasize intragenerational equity": Sumudu Araparru, "The Significance of
Internation al Environmental Law Principles in Reinforcing or Dismantlingthe NorthSourh Divide" in Shawkar Alam er al, eds, International Environmnmil Law and the

Global South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 74 at 91-92.
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In other words, the problems of "intra-generational justice" are cast on
the orthodox account as separable and separate from justice of the
"intergenerational" variety. It is this dichotomous treatment of intra- and
intergenerational justice that we wish to challenge, using the context of
"everyday toxics" as our central case study. We argue that this tendency in
the orthodox intergenerational justice literature to define the "interests" ofa
given generation as an aggregate of all individual interests, is both
misleading as description and perilous as prescription. It glosses over the
significant disparities within generations, and thus cannot provide the
analytical tools to think about how those disparities persist and transform
over time. The conventional, dualist theory of intergenerational equity
referenced above has generally been developed in the contexts of climate
change and natural resource depletion. Given the reality that particular
individuals and communities will have diHerent abilities to insulate
themselves from the effects ofclimate change and resource scarcity, there is
reason to doubt this approach even in the contexts where it was first
advanced. 14 But in the context of everyday toxics, the social dimensions of
potential intergenerational harms are especially stark.
This article will illustrate the interconnections between-in fact the
inseparability of-intra- and intergenerational justice, focusing on two
categories of"everyday toxics". Exposure to everyday toxics occurs routinely
to everyone living in the industrialized Global North as they move d1rough
their days coming into repeated contact with endocrine-disrupting
chemicals and other toxics present in ambient air and drinking water, and
"built-in" to their home, work and school environments. 15 The two
categories of everyday toxics that we employ in this paper are Brominated
Flame Retardants (BFRs) and phthalates. Exposures to BFRs and
phthalates present initial adverse health risks to those exposed, and they

li

See Anna Grear, "Towards New Legal Futures? In Search of Renewing Foundations" in
Anna Grear & Evadnc Gram, eds, Thought, Law, Rights and Action in the Age of

Environmental Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015) 283 at 286.
lS

Endocrine Disruptors Action Group, Toxic ~y Dt!sign: liliminating HarmfUl flame

Rettirdant Chemical< From Our Bodies, Hom es, & Communities (2016), onlinc:
< rndocrinedisruptorsaction.org>.
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may also have consequences for the generations that flow from those
initially exposed. These consequences cannot be adequately understood or
addressed without attention to the matrix ofsocial, ecological, and material
forces that bring these chemicals into economies, communities, homes, and
bodies; that shape the lives of those experiencing their possible effects; and
that build the pathways through which those effects traverse generations.
In light of these interlocking social, ecological, and material realities of
exposure and effects, we advance an alternative theoretical approach
drawing on relational theory, a body of scholarship that has long advocated
contextual analysis, focus on the embodied diversity of individual persons,
and appreciation for the centrality ofsocial relationships in defining justice
problems and crafting responses. The literature on relational theory to
date has not engaged directly with questions of intergenerationaljusticequestions which are at the center of our consideration of everyday toxics,
given the long time-horizons of their possible effects. 16 As noted above, the
orthodox account of intergenerational justice often lacks a sophisticated
account of social relationships. Our aim in chis paper is to bridge the gap
between these approaches by exploring what a relational acwunt of

intergenerationaljustice rn ight entail.
Part II of this paper elaborates our core case study: everyday exposure to
endocrine-disrupting (or hormone-disrupting) chemicals, particularly
BF Rs and phthalates. We explain our choice to focus on this particular issue
with reference to several contextual factors that make BFR and phthalate
exposure a particularly salient context for working through a more
relational account of intergenerational justice, namely: ( 1) the ubiquity of
these chemicals, and the enduring political economic context
undergirding their pervasiveness, (2) the nature and uncertainty of
potential harms, and (3) the social determinants of exposure levels and
possible adverse health consequences.
Part III describes the orthodox account of intergenerational justice, and
its critics, emphasizing this account's problematic tendency to elide
significant social contexts through recourse to generational aggregates. Part
IV introduces our proposed alternative: a relational approach to
ll>

See Part IV, bdow.
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intergenerational justice. This part begins by setting out the basic contours
of relational theory, a body of scholarship that has long emphasized
attention to context and relationship, and setting out the challenges and
opportunities that long time horizons pose for relational theory. The
balance of the paper explores two dimensions of "uncertainty" about the
future which demand further exploration in order to flesh out a relational
account of intergenerational justice: the uncertainty that derives from the
fact that the forces of toxic materiality resist prediction and control (Part
IV.A), and the indeterminacy that derives from a context where the relevant
constituencies do not yet exist-focusing in particular on critical
perspectives on futurity and embodied difference (IV.B). These
explorations will draw on interdisciplinary scholarly traditions-material
feminism and critical disability studies respectively-that have developed
largely outside oflegal scholarship.
More specifically, Part IV.A will build on existing relational criticisms of
the privilegingof"control" in liberal accounts ofhuman autonomy, and will
confront the challenge of how political communities might craft stances
towards present and future justice problems which embrace uncertainty
while resisting defeatism. This part will rely on scholarship within a
material feminist mode to illuminate the extent to which our desires to
predict and "control" our futures may be troubled by the activities of
chemicals and other materials whose movements might be understood
as "agentic".
Part IV.B will ask how the relational imperative to solicit diverse
perspectives might operate in an intergenerational context where some
relevant constituencies do not yet exist, and cannot therefore be directly
consulred in contemporary legal and political processes. This section will
resist the tendency in the orthodox intergenerational justice literature to
resort to "objective" accounts ofhuman interest, and will argue instead that
a relational approach to intergenerational justice requires attention to
diverse perspectives on futurity. To this end, this section will elaborate on
one crucial discourse that is omitted from the orthodox account of
intergenerational justice, and from many public conversations about
everyday toxics, namely critical disability studies. In particular, this
exploration will demonstrate the need for caution in defining "harm" in
ways that are both responsive to the potentially urgent consequences of

8

UBC LAW REVIEW

VOL 51:1

toxic exposures, and respectful of the diverse bodies that populate our
contemporary and future worlds.
Part V concludes with a synthesis of the ways in which these analyses
might contribute to an ecologically- and materially-immersed relational
account of intergenerational justice. Here, the orthodox framing of a series
ofdiscrete, monolithic "generations" with distinct and competing interests
is replaced by an account of embodied subjects who are constituced by
interwoven threads of personal, institutional, material, and ecological
relationships-each of which connect persons and responsibilities over
time. While the focus of this article is on the need to reorient the
theoretical foundations of intergenerational justice, some reflections are
offered in conclusion on the more concrete implications of our proposed
approach for efforts to craft laws and institutions that may better account
for the diverse interests of future persons.

II. EVERYDAY TOXICS IN CONTEXT
Lead poisoning from tap water in Flint, Michigan presents a recent,
unusually public example of the uneven effects of everyday toxics in North
America. 17 A growing body of scientific research on everyday toxic exposure
has led to a shift in "concern about environmental pollution from outdoors
to indoors ... , and from rivers to veins." 1' Unlike lead, around which there

17

See "That Flinty Taste: How Michigan State Government Endangered the People of
Flinr" The Emnomist (23 January 2016), online: <\V\V\v.economist.com>. The horror in
Flinr demonstrates vividly the way rhar today's toxic exposures (in this case lead, which
harms the brains of growing children) are layered onto existingdisadvamage (the racism
that poor, Black childrrn in Hint already face), and constitute our fotures (as those
exposed children grow in to adults with high health burdens ,rnd lower earnings. further
fuelling racist attitudes that diminish them and their own future children's worth). See
also Laura Pulido, "Hint, Environmental Racism, and Racial Capitalism" (2016) 27:3
Capitalism Namre Socialism 1 (arguing rhat Flint's poisoning is a powerful example of
environmental racism and racial capitalism).

I~

RG Altman er al, "Pollution Comes Home and Gets Personal: \'{romcn's Experience of
Household Chemical Exposure" (2008) 49:4 J Health & Soc Behav 417 at 418, citing
Douglas Fischer, "Stare to Trace Toxins from Streams to Veins", The 011kland Tribune
(29 September 2006). See also Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk.? Making Deci.iions in a Toxic
Environment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); 1'1ichdle Murphy, Sick
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phthalates are used as plasticizers in polyvinyl chloride (PVC), which is in
turn used in building materials, plumbing, floors, wall coverings, and food
processing equipment.22 Phthalate esters are used as solvents and plasticizers
in lacquers, varnishes, nail polish, hairspray, perfumes, lotions, cosmetics,
pharmaceutical capsules, medical devices (including intravenous tubing,
blood nutrient bags, and tubing used in neonatal intensive care nurseries),
and children's toys and bath books.23 These common chemicals have been
detected in household dust, food, drinking water, and human breast milk.' 1
Studies of human exposure to phthalates have "established an accepted
consistent presence of these chemicals in human systems,"' 5 and the Center
for Disease Control reports that nearly all Americans exhibit "measurable
levels" of phthalates in their bodily tissues.U'
Brominated Flame Retardants-BFRs-are similarlyubiquicous, used
in mattresses, upholstered furniture, televisions, computers, cars, clothing,
and children's toys.27 Like phthalates, BFRs are found in household dust, 2"

Sec Donatclla Caserra er al, "The Influence of Endocrine Disruptors in a Selected
Population oflnferrile Women" (2013) 29: S Gynecological Endocrinology444 at 446;
Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 307; Swan, supra note 21 ar 177.
Sec Swan, supra note 21 at 17 8; Donarella Caserta er al, supra note 22 at 446.
21

See Grady & Sarhyanarayana, supra note 21 ar 307, citing Ruthann A Rudel et al,
"Phthalates, Alkylphenols, Pesticides, Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers, and Other
Endocrine-disrupting Compounds in Indoor Air and Dust" (2003) 37:20 Envd Sci &
Tech 4543 and Katharina M Main ct al. "Human Breast J\filk Contamination >vith
Phthalates and Alterations of Endogenous Reproductive Hormones in Infants Three
Monchs of Age" (2006) 114:2 Envd Healch Perspectives 270.

25

Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 309, citing Michael H Hsieh et al,
"Associations Among Hypospadias, Cryptorchidism, Anogenical Distance, and
Endocrine Disruption" (2008) 9:2 Curr Urology H.137.
Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 307, citing US, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Third National Report on Human Exposure to Environment1zl Chemic1zl>
(Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, Division of
Laboratory Sciences, 200 5).
Sec Alcursu er al, supra note 21 at 345; John D Meeker er al, "Polybrominarcd Di phenyl
Ed1er (PBDE) Concentrations in House Dust are Related to Hormone Levels in Men"
(2009) 407: 10 Sci Tora! Environment 3425; Chanley M Small ct al, "Reproductive

2018

INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE

11

and are "increasingly present in che environment and humans." 2vBFRs have
been found in human blood, tissue, and breast milk, at particularly elevated
levels in North America where the use and manufacture ofBFRs remain
highest." 1 Even in jurisdictions where the manufacture and use of specific
BFRs has been phased-out or curbed (either voluntarily or under legal
compulsion), human exposure continues due to the presence of those
substances in older products, and due to the environmental persistence of
these chemicals."
The reasons for this pervasiveness are complex. Capitalist imperatives of
growth and accumulation, and Global North consumerism are major
drivers. 32 Phthalates are widely considered to have useful applications that

Outcomes Among Women Exposed to a Brominated Flame Retardant in Utero" (2011)
66:4Arch Env & Occup H 201at201; Young Ran Kim et al, "Health Consequrncesof
Exposure to Bromin ated Flame Retardants: A Systematic Review" (2014) 106
Chemosphere 1 at 2.
See Meeker et al, supra note 27 at 3425, citingJoseph G Allen et al, "LinkingPBDEs in
House Dust to Consumer Products Using X-ray Fluorescence'' (2008) 42: 11 Envtl Sci
&Tech4222.
Kim ct al, supm note 27 at 2. Sec also Mahiba Shoeib ct al, "Legacy and Current-Use
Flame Retardants in House Dust from Vancouver, Canada" (2012) 169 Envtl
Pollution 175.
10

See lvfeeker et al, supra note 27 at 3425. See also Small et al, supra note 27 (noting
widespread exposure at 201), citing Andreas Sjodin et al, "Serum Concentrations of
Poly-brominated Di phenyl Ethers (PBDEs) and PolybrominatedBiphenyl (PBB) in the
United States Population: 2003-2004" (2008) 42:4 Envtl Sci &Tech 1377 (and noting
persistence in the envi ronment and organic tissue); Kathleen Kreiss, Caralee Roberts &
Harold EB Humphrey, "Serial PBB Levels, PCB Levels, and Clinical Chemistries in
J\fichigan's PBB Cohort" (1982) 37 :3 Arch Envtl Health 141; and Jacob de Boer, Karin
de Boer & Jan P Boon, "Polybromin ated Biphenyls and Diphenyl Ethers" in Jaakko
Paasivirta, cd, The H1wdbook of Environmental Chemistry: P1irt K· N ew Typ e.< of

Per:•istent H.dogenated Compounds, vol 3 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000) 61.
31

Sec Meeker ct al, supm note 27 at 3425, citing US EPA, PolybmmirliitedDiphenylEthers
(PBDEs) Project Pla n (\X'.tshington, DC: United States Environmental l'rotection

Agency Office of Pollution Prevention Toxics, 2006). See also Kim et al, supra note 27
at 2.
32

This has been recognized in the climate change context as well. Sec e.g. l' Newell & M
Patterson, Climate Capitalism: Global H1m ning and the Transformation oftht Global
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cannot be readily duplicated by non-toxic substances.'1 Moreover,
phthalates are made from the by-products of oil refining, and their
manufacture is supported by "industrial ecologies" that encourage the
repurposing of toxic waste.31 BF Rs rely on chemical inputs which are highly
toxic, resulting in a small number of manufacturing sites concentrated in
the United States and Israel. 15 The BFR industry has been active in
promoting standards that eftectively require the use of these flame
retardants in household products as a fire safety precaution, despite
questions about the safety and effectiveness ofBFRs in real fires."' In both
cases, powerful economic actors have carefully cultivated a regulatory
environment in which uncertain, contested and incomplete scientific
evidence about the health effects of everyday toxic exposures persists.'"

Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): M Koch, Capitalism and
Climate Change: Theoretical Discussion, Historical Development and Policy Responses
(Basingstoke: Palgravc i\facmillan, 2012).
33

As an example, the addition of phthalatcs to PVC, such as for use in plumbing, renders
plastic less brittle and thus more durable and versatile. According to the Lowell Center
for Sustainable Production, PVC products contain up to 50% by weight of plasticizers,
mosrly phthalatcs. \\Thilc there arc alternatives available, many of them arc also of
unknown toxicity. See Lowell Center for Sustainable Production, Phthalates and Their
A!tanativ1cs: He1ifth and Environmental Concerns (Lowell, MA: University of
Massachusetts, 2011 ), o.nline: <susrainableproduccio.n.org>.

See e.g. Hardin B Tibbs, "The Value Loop - A New Framework for Business Thinking"
in Dora Marinova, David Annandale & John Phillimorc, eds, The Internation1if
Handbook on Environmental Technology 1Wanagement (Northampton, ~\fA: Edward

Elgar, 2006).
3)

Sec P Guerra ct al, "Introduction to Brominatcd Flame Retardants: Commercially
Products, Applications, and Physicochernical Properties;' in E Eljarrat and D Barcelo,
eds, Bmminated Flame Ret11rd1wts, Handbook of Environmental Chemistry, vol 16,
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2011) 1at6-7.
Sec Endocrine Disruprors Action Group, supra note 15.

See e.g. David Michaels, Doubt !( Their Product: How Industry'.( Assault on Science
Thrtatens Your Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): r Pearce & S 'fombs,
'"foxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the Chemical bidustry" in D Whyte, ed,
Crimes ofthe Porverji;f: A Reader (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009) 93.
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These dynamics are exacerbated by the endurance, in Canada and the
United States, of a "permissive approach" to chemicals regulation in which
the burden of proof falls on those trying to show that chemicals are
harmful, and not on those who profit from their production and release.-'s
Since the early 1990s, environmental advocates have made efforts to
pressure state regulators to adopt a more precautionary approach. 19 But
while the "precautionary principle" has been enshrined in policy statements
and legislative preambles, the operation of the relevant regulatory
frameworks are still largely permissive in practice.'0 In line with this
approach, and driven by the prevailing tenets of neoliberalism, the reforms
that have been introduced to manage the emerging risks from everyday
toxics have favoured voluntary, information-based regulatory measures.ii
There are thus relatively few legal restraints on the industrial and market
processes driving the production of these chemicals, and their
incorporation into consumer products. 12 In cases where particular
compounds are restricted, scientists and industry act quickly to supply
18

See e.g. Lynda Collins & Heat her McLeod-Kilmurray, The Canadian LmvofToxir Torts
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 20 14); Dayna N adinc Scorr, "Testing Toxiciry: l'rooLmd
Precaution in Canada's Chemicals Management Plan" (2009) 18: l RE CIEL 59 [Scott,
'"ksting 'foxicity"]; Adam DK Abdkop & John Graham, "Regulation of Chemical
Risks: Lessons for Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act from Canada and the
European Union" (2015) 32:1 Pace Envd L Rev 108.

:N

See e.g. Hugh Benevides & Theresa McClenaghan, Implementing Pretaution:AnNGO
Re.1ponse to the Governmmt of Canada's Discussion Document ('foromo: Canadian

Environmental Law Association, April 2002), online: <www.cda.ca/ sices/ cda.ca/
filcs/ uploads/419preeautionary.pdf>. Sec also the recent report of rhe Standing
Committee: House of Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and
Sustainable] )cvclo pmenc, Healthy Environment, Healthy Canadians, H ealthy Economy:
Strengthening the Cm.idian Environmental Protertion Act, 1999 (June 2017), online:

<http ://>vww.ourcommons.ca/ ])ocumcntVicwcrI en/ 42-1/ ENVI/ rcporr-8 >.
Scott, "Testing Toxicity': supr.-t note 38.
D ayna Nadine Scott, "Thinking about Thresholds, Literal and Figurative" in Dayna
Nadine Scott, cd, Our Chemical Selves: Gender, Ti1xics, and Environmental H ealth
(Vancouver: UBC l'rcss, 2015).
42

Sec

e.g.

Phthalates

Regul11tions, SOR/ 2010-298,

and

Children's

Sleepwear

Regulations, SOR/2011 -15 (for examples of existing regulations in Canada).
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chemicals with similar properties which have not yet been subject to
scientific scrutiny or advocacy and attention!' This problem of" regrettable
substitution" has given rise to the critique that the health and
environmental agencies charged with ensuring chemical safety have been
drawn into a costly game of regulatory "whack-a-mole".44
B.

DISPARATE IJ\fl'ACT

As pervasive as BFR and phthalate exposure may be, it is not evenly
distributed. In fact, researchers have begun to chart familiar patterns of
human exposure across demographic groups. 4 ' Their findings suggest that,
whatever the precise effects of BFR and phthalate exposure prove to be,
they will likely be felt unevenly across diverse social constituencies. This
research has shown, for example, that workers in certain manufacturing
industries exhibit higher phthalate levels and that e-waste recycling workers
have higher BFR levels due to occupational exposure.'" Certain racialized
groups,47 and those with lower levels of income and education," have also

4."\

See e.g. Gregory DL Morris, "Phchalates Ban in 'loys Spurs Alcernacives" (2009) 17 1:5
Chemical \'('eek 25; Arlene Blum, "Tackling Toxics" (2016) 351:6278 Science 1117 .
\~'idespread animal testing is permitted and encouraged at every stage of this process,
wich no legal onus on any parry to escablish thac che chemicals at issue will be put to
socially useful or necessary applications. See e.g. Lesli Bisgould, Animal> and the Law
(' foromo: Irwin Law, 2011) ac 201-23 3. C/Mimi Brody, "Animal Research: A Call for
Legislative Reform Requiring Echical Meric Review" ( 1989) 13:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 423.
See Blum, supra note 43 (describing the "regrettable substitmion of a harmfol chemical
with a less-studied cousin" as being"like 'a game of whack-a-mole: according to Donald
Kennedy (former editor-in-chief of Science and former commissioner of the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration)" at 1117).

4)

Sec Swan, supra note 21 at 178.
See Cynthia J Hines et al, "Estimated Daily Intake of Phthalates in Occupationally
Exposed Groups" (2011) 21:2] Expo Eci Env Epid 133; Nguyen Minh 'foe et al,
"Accumulation of l'olychlorinarcd Biphcnyls and Brominatcd Flame Retardants in
Breast ~.\filk from W1omen Living in Vietnamese E-waste Recycling Sites" (2010) 408:9
Sci 'focal Environ 2155.
See Roni W Kobmsly et al, "Socioeconomic Factors and Phthalate ;\fetabolite
Concentrations among Uniced Scates Women ofReproduccive Age" (2012) 11 S Envtl
Res 11; Heather M Stapleton ct al, "Scrum l'BDEs in a North Carolina Toddler
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been found to exhibit particularly high levels of exposure to certain
phchalates. Exposure to some BF Rs has similarly been found to be highest
in low-income communities of colour.49 Although BFR and phthalate
exposure occurs in the home, school, and workplace, these demographic
exposure patterns reverberate with the longstanding environmental justice
problem that marginalized communities are also disproportionately
exposed to ambient environmental pollution, notably poor air quality. \()
Research on BFR and phthalate exposure demographics remains in its
preliminary stages, and the explanatory variables that might account for
differential exposure are not well understood. Researchers have
hypothesized that culturally and economically influenced factors such as
diet, housing stock, furniture quality, and use ofpersonal care products may

Cohort: Associations with Handwipcs, House Dust, and Socioeconomic Variables"
(2012) 120 Envd Health Perspectives 1049; cf' Huguem 'forgeon O 'Brien et al,
"Exposure to 'foxic Metals and Persistent Organic Pollutams in Inuit Children
Attending Childcare Centers in Nunavik, Canada" (2012) 46: 8 Envtl Sci & Tech 461 4.
See Kobrolsy et al, supra note 4 7; Jung-Wan Koo et al, "The Association Between
Biomarker-based Exposure Estimates for Phthalates and Demographic Factors in a
Human Reference Population" (2002) 110:4 Envtl Health Perspectives 405.
See Zota et al, "PHDEs", supra note 21; Stapleton et al, supra note 47 ; Gary
Adamkiewicz et al, "Moving EnvironmentalJustice Indoors: Understanding Structural
Influences on Residential Exposure Patterns in Low-Income Conununities" (2011)
101 :Sl AmJ Pub Health 5238 at S241; Ami R Zora er al, "Elevated House Dust and
Serum Concentrations of PBDEs in California: Unintended Consequences of
Furniture Flammability Standards?" (200 8) 42: 21 Envrl Sci & Tech 8158; Melissa Rose
et al, "PBDEs in 2-5 Year-old Children from California and Associations with Diet and
Indoor Environment" (2010) 44:7 Envd Sci & 'lC:ch 2648; Gayle C Windham et al,
"Body Burdens of Brominated Flame Retardanrs and Other Persistent OrganoH alogenated Compounds and their Descriptors in US Girls" (2010) 110:3 Envtl
Research 251. Conversely, exposure to some HF Rs is higher among groups of higher
socio-economic status. See Stapleton et al, supra note 47 .
See e.g. Dayna Nadine Scott, "Situating Sarnia: 'Unimagined Communities' in d1e New
Nation al Energy Debate" (2013) 25 J Envtl L & Prac 81; Zora et al, "PBDEs", supra
note 21; Rob Nixon, SioUJ Violence and the Environmentalism ofthe Poor (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2011);11ichad Buzzelli, EnviromnentalJustite in Canada: it
lvfatters T1/here Yrm Live (Canadian Policy Research Ncrnmrk, 2008), onlinc:

<rcrpp.ca/documents/ 5087 5_EN .pdf>.
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be significant. 51 Many researchers working in this field have further
suggested that, in order to fully understand the impact of these differential
exposure levels on marginalized populations, it will be necessary to study
the ways that phthalate and BFRexposure interacts with a number ofsocial
variables, including nutrition, time spent indoors, and stress levels
associated with poverty or housing insecurity.52 Moreover, public health
responses have often encouraged individuals and families to insulate
themselves from BFR and phd1alate exposure through purchasing decisions
(i.e., "precautionary consumption") and household maintenancedirections which present special obstacles for those without adequate
economic resources and which have been shown to place disproportionate
burdens on women in particular.'' While the precise consequences of
exposure remain uncertain (as will be discussed in the following
subsection), the social dimensions of BFR and phthalate exposure suggest
that any resulting effects are likely to compound existing social and
economic cleavages.
C. UNCERTAIN EHEC'l'S

Both BFRs and pluhalates have come under scrutiny in recent years, as
scientific research has begun co illuminate possible health consequences
associated with these chemicals. In adults, exposure to phthalates has been
linked to infertility and to effects on the liver and kidneys, including
increased risk ofliver cancer. 51 Studies show that men in particular may be
vulnerable to decreased respiratory function, obesity, insulin resistance, and

Kobrolsy et al, supra note 47 at 12; Zota et al, «PBDEs", supm note 21; Adamkiewic et

al, supra note 49 at S241.
52

Zota et al, "PBDEs''. supra note 21 at 5692; Rachel Morello-Frosch et al,
"Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Inequalities in Environmental Health:
Implications for Policy" (2011) 30:5 H Aff879.

53

Sec Dayna Nadine Scott, Jennie Haw & Robyn Lee, '"W~rnnabc Toxic Free?' From
Precautionary Consumption to Corporeal Citizenship" (2017) 26:2 Envtl Pol 322.
Swan, supra note 21 at 177; Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 309 (citing
Giovanna Ti·anfo et al, "Urinary Phthalate Monoesters Concentration in Couples with
Infertility Problems" (2012) 213:1 'fox Lett 15).
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effects on the thyroid, due to phthalate exposure. 15 In women, one recent
study has associated the presence ofphthalate metabolites in women's urine
with low bone density and heightened incidence of osteoporosis.SC'
Childhood exposure to various phthalates in household dust has been
linked to asthma, wheezing, rhinitis and eczema.'7 BFRs may also have
co nse q uen ces for those exposed-i nduding altered ho rm one levels, 18 earlier
onset of puberty for girls, 59 and other effects on endocrine system
functioning.6° One recent meta-study ofBFR research concluded that there
is a "possible relationship between BFR exposure and serious health
consequences, namely cancer, such as digestive system cancers and
lymphoma, reproductive health effects, alteration in thyroid function,
neurobehavioral and developmental outcomes in children, and diabetes.'' 61
The effects ofBFR and phthalate exposure, moreover, may reach across
generationallines. There is increasing scientific support for the theory that
children, even grandchildren, ofthose exposed to BF Rs and phthalates may
incur health consequences. In part, this concern arises from studies on the
effects of in utero and early childhood exposure. In utero exposure to
phthalates, for example, has been associated with decreased testosterone
production during the sex differentiation phase of fetal development,
resulting in morphological differences in male genitalia, some ofwhich may

51

Swan, supm note 21 at 182-83.

56

Kyoung-bok Min & Jin-young Min, "Urinary Phthalate Metabolites and the Risk of
Low Hone Mineral Density and Osteoporosis in Older \\!omen" (2014) 99: 10 J Clin
Endocr ~Ietab El997.

57

Swan, supm note 21 at 182.

58

:Meeker er al, supm note 2 7 at 3428.

59

Small et al, supra note 27 at 205 (citing Heidi Michels Blanck et al, "Age at Menarche
and Tanner Stage in Girls Exposed in Utero and Postnatally to Polybrominated
Biphenyl" (2000) 11 :6 Epidemiology 641 ).

60

Meeker et al, supra noce 27 at 3426.

61

Kirn et al, .iupra note 27 at 17.
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affect reproductive health later in life. 62 Similarly, elevated BFR levels in
women have been associated with physical consequences for their male
babies, including lower testosterone levels and testicle size/'3 as well as lower
sperm production throughout adult life.61 Females exposed to BF Rs in utero
and through their mothers' breast milk have been found to be more likely to
experience spontaneous abortions as adults.65 While the "exact mechanism"
remains to be explained, scientists hypothesize that in utero exposure to
certain BFRs may affect the development of the female reproductive
system, including the fetal development of the primordial follicles which
supply eggs throughout a woman's life."'" Temporally and generationally
speaking, the effects ofBFR and phthalate exposure may be far-reaching, as
health effects may continue to present multiple generations after exposure.67

Grady & Sathyanarayana, supra note 21 at 308-09 (noting, in particular, evidence
that phthalatc exposure has been linked to reduced anogcnital distance); Swan, supra
note 21.
"'

J\fcekcr er al, supra note 27 at 3428 (citingMcijcr er al, "Influence ofl'rcnatal Exposure
to Selected Organohalogcns on Infant Sexual and Neurological D evelopment" (2008)
70:658 Organohalogen Compounds J 61 ).

(-}4

Meeker et al, supra note 27 at 3428 (citing animal studies).
Small ct al, supra note 27 .

(>(;

"

7

ibid.
J\fatthew D Anway er al, "Epigenetic Transgcncrarional Actions of Endocrine
Disruptors and ~fale Fertility'' (2005) 308:5727 Science 1466; Jocelyn Kaiser,
"Endocrine Disrupters 'lhgger fertility Problems in Multiple Generations" (2005)
308: 5727 Science 1391 at 1391; Sarah C Marrcinson er al, "Multi-generational Effects
of Polybrominated Diphenylethers Exposure: Embryonic Exposure of Male American
Kestrels (hlco sparverius) to DE-71 Alters Reproductive Success and Behaviors" (2010)
29: 8 Envrl Toxicology & Chemistry 1740; Kim JFernie ct al, "Changes in Reproductive
Courtship Behaviors of Adult American Kestrels (Falco sparverius) Exposed to
Environmentally Relevant Levels of the Polybrominated Diphrnyl Ether Mixture,
DE-71" (2008) 102:1 Toxicological Sci 171; Kim J Fernie er al, "Environmentally
Relevant Concentrations of DE-71 and HBCD Alter Eggshell Thickness and
Reproductive Success of American Kestrels" (2009) 43:6 Envd Sci & 'frch 2124;
Timothy J Doyle ct al, "Transgcncrarional Effccrs ofDi-(2-erhylhcxyl ) Phrhalarc on
Testicular Germ Cell Associations and Spermatogonial Stem Cells in Mice" (2013) 88:5
Biol Reprod 112 at 10.
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The emerging research on "epigenetics" sheds further light on the
intergenerational nature ofpossible exposure effects. Epigenetics describes a
process by which bodies are able to "detect their environment and tag
the DNA in ways that can be understood by the cells of subsequent
offapring . . . [thus] allow[ ing] cells to adapt very rapidly to their
environment and [to] pass that adaptation on to future generations."6~
Research into a number of chemicals including endocrine-disruptors like
BFRs and phthalates is showing possible epigenetic-and elms
intergenerational-effects related to various chronic conditions and
illnesses such as cancer, diabetes and obesity, infertility, respiratory diseases,
as well as allergies and neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson's and
Alzheimer's disease.69
Epigenetics research has emerged over the past 15 years to show how,
through various biochemical processes, genes become "switched on and off"
in response to changes in their environment. As an example, what scientists
learned from studying the health later in life of children whose mothers
experienced a famine while they were in utero, is that those children "are
born with methyl groups stripped from several genes involved in growth
and metabolic control, with the result that they are predisposed to
conserving energy". 70 All organisms, then, acquire subtle changes to the way
in which their genes are expressed as they move through life. Some of these
changes might be positive or neutral, and some can cause harm.71 Most

c,~

Jade Johnsron, "Lamarck Lives! 'l 'he Epigenetic Revol mi on in Environmemal Health"
(16 January 2010), Health cir Environment (blog), online: <healthandenvironmemblog

.wordpress.com/issue-archive/ epigenetics> (quoting Dr. Thea Edwards).
69

Tohnston, supra note 68 (citing Thea ~I Edwards & John Peterson Myers,
"Environmental Exposures and Gene Regulation in Disease Etiology" (2007) 115:9
Envtl Healtl1 Perpectives 1264 at 1264, online at <https:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/ articles/ l'l\IC:l 964917 /> ).

70

Lisa A Joss-Moore & Robert H Lane, "Epigenetics and tl1e Developmental Origins of
Disease: The Key to Unlocking rhc Door of Personalized Medicine" (2012) 4:5
Epigenomics 47 1.

71

Assessmenrs of what consrirures a positive, neurral, or harmful effect may be deeply
political and interlaced with the social context that affected individuals and
communities must navigate. See e.g. Part rv.B, below.
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relevant for our purposes are the data showing that exposures to
environmental chemicals can alter DNA tagging patterns, including those
effecting fertility, "[and] we don't know what it would take to get the tags
back to their original form" -or even whether such reversal would
be desirable.72
What scientists worry about, and what might be important for theorists
ofintergenerational justice, is the possibility for "mismatches between what
has been pre-programmed during development and what is encountered in
the real world".7 ' These changes include alterations in protein
concentrations, cell metabolism and differentiation. They are not
immediately identifiable in the "new generation", buc may lead to an
increased disease burden later in life. Significantly, these effects will not
impact everyone equally-not only because existing social stratification will
structure exposures-but because some of these DNA tags may require a
particular environmental or physiological trigger in orderro manifest. Thus,
we are confronted here with multiple levels of uncertainty-about the
relationship between chemicals and contemporary bodies, between
chemicals and future bodies, and about the unknown ways in which
chemically-infused contemporary and future bodies interact with their
environments and societies-environments and societies which, for future
bodies at least, we can only imagine.
III.

THE ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
Prevailing western political and legal theories and institutions are not
well-suited to addressing the effects of contemporary choices on persons
who do not yet exist, or who may never come into being.7' Philosophers in
this tradition have long debated whether it is even coherent to view future

~2

Johnston, supra note 68. l)n \vhether such changes are "desirable", see ibid.

73

"Epigcncrics and the l)cvclopn1cnral ()rigins ofl)iscasc" ( 12 ()ctobcr 2012) Health &

Environment(blog), online: <healthandenvironmentblog.wordpress.com/2012/ I 0/ 12/
epi genetics-an d-the-devel opm ental-o d gins-of-disease> .
7

'

On the challenges posed for democrac~· in particular, see supm note 6.
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persons as objects of justice or moral consideration.'' Our focus in this
section is on the legallicerature on intergenerational justice, which generally
accepts (as we do) the assumption chat we do owe moral and political
obligations to future persons. The orthodox (legal) literature on
intergenerational justice takes up a particular version of these obligations,
grounded in the principles of"intergenerational equity" advanced by Edith
Brown Weiss in her influential book, In Fairness to Future Generations.
The basic premise of intergenerational equity, as elaborated by Brown
Weiss, is that the present generation is both entitled to benefit from the
natural environment, and obligated to preserve the environment for future
generations.76 In elaborating chis obligation, Brown Weiss draws on
traditional liberal political theory, proposing chat we might use a Rawlsian
veil of ignorance to "assume the perspective of a generation that is placed
somewhere along the spectrum of time, but does not know in advance
where it will be located."77 But given the uneven distribution of toxic
exposures and effects canvassed in the preceding section, how helpful is it to
imagine any given generation as having a singular identifiable perspective or
interest respecting the regulation oftoxics? Feminist and relational theorists
have long challenged Rawls' veil of ignorance on the basis that there can be
no unsituated perspective of the kind Rawls asks us to imagine; the realities

.,

A necessarily incomplece listing of che vase literacure engaging chese quescions includes
Derek Parflt, Reasons and Per:wn.i (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Wilfred
Beckerman, "The Impossibility ofa Theory ofintergenerational Justice'' in Joerg Chet
Tremmel, ed, Handbook oflntngenerationa/]ustiff (Northampton, l\fA: Edward Elgar,
2006); Ernest Partridge, "On the Rights ofFurure Generations" in Donald Scherer, ed,

Upstream/Downstream: lssut:sinEnvironmentalEthics (Philadelphia: 'lC:mple Universicy
Press, 1990). For an introductory overview of these philosophical debates, see Lukas H
Meyer, "Intergenerational Justice" in Edward N Zalta, ed, The St.mfordEnrydopedia of

Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), <plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2016/ entl'ies/
justice-intergeneration al>.
Brown Weiss, ln Fairness, supra note 7 at 21.

Ibid at 24, citing.John Ra;v]s, A Theory oj]ustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1971).
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of embodied diversity cast doubt on Rawls' heuristic, even when it is
confined to assessing outcomes in a single political moment."
Having id en rifled "generations" as her core unit of analysis, Brown Weiss
advocates "a minimum level of equality among generations':79 and elaborates
three core "principles" of intergenerational equity:
First, each generation should be required to conserve the diversity of the
natural and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict the
options available to future generations in solving their problems and
satisfying their own values, and should be entitled to diversity comparable
to that of previous generations. This principle may be called "conservation

o.f'options." Second, each generation should be required to maintain the
quality of the planet so that it is passed on in no worse condition than the
present generation received it, and should be entitled to a quality of the
planet comparable to the one enjoyed by previous generations. This is the
principle of"crmservatirm rfquality." Third, each generation should provide
its members with equitable rights of access to the legacy from past
generations and should conserve this access for future generations. This is
the principle of"conservation ofaaess:' 80

Although we will criticize aspects of this formulation, we do not aim to
undermine the common-sense appeal of these directives. If prevailing
modes of governance throughout the Global North honoured these
principles in practice, we would regard chis as a significant improvement
over the current state of affairs. Nonetheless, we are skeptical that an
approach which treats intra- and intergenerational problems in separate
silos will be capable of grounding the ethical and political orientation
78

Sec e.g. Christine M Koggcl, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Th eory

(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contmct
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Susan Moller Okin, Gender,Justice and the
Fami(y (New York: Basic Books, 1989). ror a discussion of intergenerational justice in
the works of Rawls and other philosophers operating in the Rawlsian tradition, see
David Heyd, "A Value or an Ohligarion? Rawls on Justice ro Fururc Generations" in
Axel Gosseries & Lukas H Meyer, eds, lnte1generationalJustic1~ (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
Brown Weiss, Jn Fairness, supra noce 7 at 24-25.
8D

Ibid at 38 [emphasis added].
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necessary to restructuring social practices likely co cause short-term and
long-term harms. To that end, we note that only the third of Brown Weiss's
principles embraces "justice between generations and between memhers of

the same generation."81 As such, it is the only principle that invites
consideration of past, present, or future social conditions of difference
and inequality.
Brown Weiss's model has already attracted criticism for d1e "relative
underdevelopment ofintra-generational equity".82 Catherine Redgwell has
noted, as a quantitative matter, that Brown Weiss only directly engages wid1
intra-generational equity concerns at seven points in the entire text of In

Fairness to Future Generations." Lynda Collins maintains that, while
valid, this critique is not fatal to the project, since Brown Weiss's d1eorycan
be productively enriched by explicit incorporation ofequity concerns.s4 For
Collins, the primary difficulcy arising from inadequate attention to
intra-generational

equity

lies

in

the

face

that

"characterizing

intra-generational equity as a component of intergenerational equity
obscures the real potential for conflict between the present and future."~'
Brown Weiss does appear

to

deal somewhat perfunctorily with the

possibility of such conflict. In one summary of her theory, Brown Weiss
notes first that such conflicts may be illusory since "poverty is a major cause
ofecological degradation:' and that "meeting the basic needs of d1e poor" is
essential to ensuring that "they will have both the desire and ability to fulfil
their intergenerational obligations to conserve the planet."s6 In cases of true
81

Edith Brown \Veiss, "Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global
Environmenral Change" in Edirh Brown W'Ciss, ed, Environmental Change and

lnternation.-d LaUJ: NeUJ Ch1dlenge_,. and Dimensions (Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 1992) 385 ar 405 [emphasis added] [Brown Weiss, "Inrergcnerarional Equiry"].
Lynda M Collins, "Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global

Environmental Governance" (2007) 30:1 Dal LJ 79 at 116.
8.;

See Catherine Redgwell, lntergenemtional Trust_,. and Environment1zl Protection
(Manchester: University Press, 1999) at 109, n 208.
Collins, supra narc 82 at 116.

~'

Jhid.

86

Brown Weiss, "Intergenerational Equity", supra note 81 at 398.
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conflict, Brown Weiss remarks only that "we need to develop appropriate
mechanisms and allocate sufficient resources to maximize the ability to
both "alleviate poverty as quickly as possible" and "protect the health of the
planet for future generations."87 More generally, Brown Weiss does not
appear to move beyond generalized exhortations that "all members of the
present generation are entitled to equitable access to the legacy" of the
environment, and the insistence that "[i]nrragenerational justice requires
wealthier communities to assist impoverished ones in realizing such
access.""8 There is no suggestion in Brown Weiss's text that the experiences
of the "impoverished" should be solicited or addressed (beyond what is
required for the purpose of resource conservation), or that we ought to
question or reform the underlying structures which produce the inequalities
she observes.89
Law and development scholar Graham Mayeda develops a related
critique of Brown Weiss's approach. At the heart ofMayeda's challenge to
Brown Weiss is a concern that her focus on equality between "generations"
is "essentialist":
This is because the principle of inter-generational equity denies the
complexity of particular historical relationships .... It does so by conceiving
sustainability in terms of the relationship between abstract groups, such as
generarions, resulting in a concept of "equity" that is formalistic, being
based solely on the idea of the equitable distribution of natural resources,
and which reinforces rather than challenges present distributions
ofgoods.90

87

Ibid.
Brnwn \\Tciss, ln Fairn ess, supra norc 7 at 28.
For a similar criticism, sec Ruth Gordon, "Urnustainahlc Development" in Shawkar
Alam et al, eds, lntt:mational Environmental Law and tht: Global South (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2015) SO (asserting that "the concept of sustainable
development was conceived in large parr to engage the global South in ecological
discourse, nor to fun darn email y question global North understandings ofdevelopment
and economic growth" at 62).

Graham ;\fayeda, "Where Should Johannesburg Take Us?: Ethical and Legal
Approaches to Sustainable Development in the Context oflnternational Environmental
Law" (2004) 15:1 Colo J Inr'l Envtl L & Pol'y 29 at 49-50. Sec also Carmen G
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While Mayeda's focus is on the differing circumstances of richer and
poorer nations;'' his argument remains salient in respect of domestic
environmental policy choices within diverse contemporary polities. Even
setting aside Collins' concerns regarding possible conflicts between the
interests of present and future generations, Mayeda's critique points to the
thorny reality that "past'; "present", and "future" are each themselves
constituted by conflicts and complexities-all of which are deeply
interlaced wid1in and across temporal moments.
Demographic patterns of BFR and phthalate exposure are a case in
point. The social conditions-housing stock, air quality, education,
political voice, and financial access to "safe" consumer choices-which have
likely contributed to differential exposure patterns are profoundly
influenced by historical economic and social conditions of inequality.92 In
the present moment, those subject to heightened exposure necessarily
experience any resulting effects (consciously or not) as part of a broader
constellation ofsocial, economic, and environmental experiences; exposure
effects that may arise in future generations will be similarly shaped by the
deep and immediate past, and the specific social and material circumstances
of future lives and communities. The possible harms of exposure-and,
consequently, the most productive forms of prevention and redress-will
necessarily be tied to broad social relationships associated with race, gender,
ability, and social and economic stratification. These problems thus call for
responses grounded in an understanding of human persons and
communities as em bodied, diverse, and constituted by their social,
historical, ecological, and material circumstances. The balance of d1is paper
will seek to elaborate a theory capable of grounding such responses.

Gonzalez, "FnvironmcnralJusricc and International Fnvironmcnral Law" in Shawkar
Alam et al, eds, Routlulge Handbook oflnternational Environmental Law (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2013).
91

Mayeda, supra note 90 at 57.
See e.g. Pulido, supra note 17.
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IV. TOWARD A RELATIONAL THEORY OF
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
Scholars operating in a relational theoretical mode have endeavoured to
bring attention to the embodied, affective, and social dimensions of
problems ranging from domestic violence / 1 to education policy,9' to health
care.95 A central catalyst for the development of relational approaches has
been the perception that traditional liberal legalism is founded on a
fundamentally mistaken understanding of the human person as an
"abstracted, disembodied, rational, universal rights bearing, contracting,
possessive individual".96 In this regard, relational theory may be understood
as part of a broader set of intellectual projects d1at have sought to
challenge "the liberal humanist construction of a universal, coherent, and
self-constituting subject."97 Relational theorists instead urge that interests,
aspirations, and capacities are both {Orged in relation to other persons, and

realized through relations with other persons.98 These relations include
interpersonal relationships such as those with family, friends, or co-workers;
as well as institutional or structural relationships such as those defined by

~3

Jennifer Ncdclsky, Lau/r Relations: _.d Relational Theory o_f,Se[f; Llutonomy) and L aw
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) ch 5 at 200ff
Martha Mi now, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

9\

Sue Sherwin. "A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Healthcare" in Elisabeth
Boett.kes & Wilfrid] \X'aluchow, eds. Readings in Health Care Ethics (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2000) 69 at 69.

96

Roxanne Mykitiuk, "Fragmencingrhe Body" (1994) 2:1 AusdFem LJ 63 at79. See also
N edelsky, supra note 93 ch 4 at l 58ff; Robert Leckey, Contextual Subjects: Famdy, State

and Relational Th1~ory ('foronto: Univer sity of 'foronto Press, 2008) (setting om d1e
relational critique, as well as argumems that relational d1eorists may present an unfair
caricature ofliberal legalism at 8-9).
Lcckcy, supra note 96 at 3.
98

Tenn ifer J LI ewell yn & Jocelyn Downie, "Introduction" in Jennifer J Llewellyn & Jocelyn
Downie, eds, Being Relational: Reflections on Reltltional Theory and H ealth Law

(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012) 1at4.
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race, capitalism, or the bureaucratic stateY'' Two crucial consequences of this
relational oncology, which will be explored in turn below, are ( 1) an
acceptance that "autonomy" is a value or capacity forged in relation with
ochers, not an exercise of total "control" by a separate self; and (2) an
awareness that individual perspectives are deeply shaped by social and
embodied determinants, such that there is no such thing as an "unsituated"
standpoint-the views and experiences of actual diverse persons and
communities must be solicited in order co adequately comprehend social
choices and generate appropriate regulatory responses.
This relational vision of persons as inherently situated, embodied,
interconnected, and interdependent has offered a much-needed corrective
to the unsituated, disembodied, isolated, and freely-contracting individual
ofliberal theory. But more work needs to be done to elaborate a relational
theory chat poses an equivalent challenge to the identifiable, separable,
undifferentiated "generation" of the orthodox intergenerational justice
literature. Existing relational literature already frequently invokes imagery
and policy analyses that allude to social interconnections over time, making
Nedelsky, supra note 93 at 4. Of course, the body of relational theory we cite here is not
the first or the only intellectual tradition that has emphasized interconnection and
relat ionship as cencral tenets. For example, Gordon Christie notes that:

[Tl ndividuals in Aboriginal societies are seen as interwoven into intric;1te \.vebs o freLuionship s,
the self being defined in it s rel.it ion to others ... individuals ;<re conceptualized in Aboriginal
societies as nod,...- in these wehs, as relatively (i.w·d,mddetermined beings connected by srrand 1 of

the web. The identity of these individuals (and the various communities they collectively
comprise) is provided by the responsibilities they have, which work to we;\Ve the web of which
they are parts. T here are, quite simply, things the individual must do, responsibilities to fam ily,

clan and community that must be respected and that mw t lead to action. Responsibilities act to
define a core of che identity of the individual, jusc as the existence of a society centred around
responsibilities define.1 the identity of Aboriginal communities.

Gordon Christie, "Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples (2003) 2: 1 Indigenous LJ 67 at
110-11 Iemphasis in original]. The Indigenous legal cheory Christie describes differs in
important respects from the relational theory set om here-for example, in describing

persons as "nodes'' or "fixed and determined beings" rather than (as relational theorists
would have it) as continuously constituted and reconstituted by their relationships

(supra note 98 and accompanying text); and in describing persons as bound by things
which they "must'' do, as opposed

to

the relational conception of rights and

responsibilities as being open ro constant social contcstation and redefinition (infra note
135 and accompanying text).
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this body of scholarship a fruitful starting point for theorizing
intergenerational justice. One ofJennifer Nedelsky's most compelling and
personal challenges to the liberal vision of the singular, bounded self is her
experience of interconnection with her own young and unborn children. 10 ''
Moreover, the lives and choices of previous generations are consistently
present in the relational construction of contemporary problems, and the
common relational focus on root structural change implies a prescriptive
vision concerned with the interests of future persons. 101 But the problems
posed by everyday toxics require a more focused and deliberate reckoning
with the puzzles of intergenerational justice than these treatments offer.
The following sections explore the contributions that two bodies of
scholarship might make m developing a relational account of
intergenerational justice. First, we explore how the problem of
everyday toxic exposure calls on us to deepen the relational critique of
autonomy-as-control. Drawing on recent scholarship in materialfiminism,
we argue that everyday toxic exposure demands that relational theory
expand the sphere of "relationships" conditioning autonomy to include
complex and unpredictable forms of "agency" exhibited by matter,
ecologies, and chemical flows. Second, we consider the implications of the
relational mandate to consider diverse perspectives as applied on an
intergenerational scale wherein future persons and communities cannot
express their experiences directly. To this end, we suggest that engaging
diverse contemporary perspectives on futurity is a crucial component of
relational intergenerational justice. We may temper the unknowability of
future persons by developing more relational accounts that consider diverse,
situated contemporary perspectives as to the values and priorities that
ought to shape our obligations through time. To this end, we take the
literature on critical disability studies as a guide, illuminating the
intergenerational dimensions of the imperative to foster social norms that
are welcoming of embodied difference. As we consider the possible
100

Nedelsky, supra note 93 at 111.

lOJ

See generally Nedelsky, supra noce 93; Colleen Sheppard, Jndusive };'quality: The
Relational Dimensions 1!(Systemic Discrimination in Ciw11da (Monrreal & Kingsron:

McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).
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fixed characteristic of persons, autonomy is cast as a capacity that can be
developed or thwarted by an individual's specific circumstances. 10' This
reconceptualization of autonomy unsettles the widespread association
between "autonomy" and "control", since
[w ]hen we focus on the relationships that make autonomy possible, we
muse recognize that we do not choose many of the relationships most
central in developing our capacity for autonomy.... [\XT]c arc forced to
recognize both the interdependence that makes autonomy possible and our
lack of control over it. ' 06

Legal scholarship in relational theory has demonstrated that social
relationships, both interpersonal and structural, can condition the
autonomy of individuals, but it has not explored in depth the way that
ecological or material relations might do so. 107 Material feminists have
proposed that chemicals moving through environments might be best
understood as "actants" exhibiting a form of "agency", behaving in
unpredictable ways that shape and condition our autonomy-in effect, tl1at

ios

See e.g. Sherwin, supra note I02 at 13, 26; and lvfackenzie & Stoljar, supm note I02
at 22.

106

See Nedelsky, supra note 93 at 278, 292. Nedelsky does not deny the importance of
"consciously formulating intentions and hopes and trying to shape one's life
accordingly'', but rather believes that the language of "control" is not an optimal
descripcor for such auconomy, since it fails to "engage wirh difference in a way that
advances equality." Ibid at 292 and 278.

107

But sec Harris, supra note 1 at 114 (describing the "'environmentally embedded' subject"
in rhe context of "vulnerability" theory). L1digcnous scholarship in a range of fields
including sociology and anthropology has long emphasized the "embeddedness of
humans and animals in shared social, cultural, political, and economic relationships", as
well as recognized agency for rhe 'n10re-than-hum,rn' world: Zoe Todd, "Fish Pluralities:
Human-Animal Relations and Sites of Engagement in Paulatuuq, Arctic Canada"
(2014) 38:1-2 Cultures Inuit, Gouvernance et Cosmopolitiques 217 at 232.
Furthermore, this rclationali ry has been recognized as a fundamental characteristic of
the Indigenous legal orders that are living and practiced today, despite their subjugation
to Canadian coloniallaw. See e.g. Saral1 Hunt, "Ontologies oflndigeneity: The Politics
of Embodying a Concept" (2014) 21 :1 Culrural Geographies 27;John Borrows, "Living
Between \Vater and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning, and Democracy''

(1997) 47:4 U'l'LJ 417.
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our relevant relations are not just with each other, bur also with and
through the material world. Because these materials may operate in ways
that impact the possible:: descendants of those exposed, the legal
subject becomes cognizable as a link in a chain of bodies that spans
generations-as at once a moral end and a vessel for chemical intensities
and flows. 108 Existing relational frameworks capture structural relations that
include broad institutional and economic forces, and our modified version
would further incorporate ecological realities and broader time horizons so
as to account for social and "material systems in their complex
interlocking totality."109
Material feminists pursue a range of scholarly and political
commitments, but significantly for our purposes, share a core focus on the
dynamism and social relevance of "things themselves''. 110 In many ways,

8

See Jessica Eisen, "Beyond Rights and \Velfare: Democracy, Dialogue and the Animal
V?clfarc Act" 51: 1 :i\1ich JL Reform [forthcoming in 2018] (on the relational imperative
to view persons as both means and ends) .

io;

Elisabeth Grosz, The Nick of"Time: Politics, Evolution and the Untimely (Durham: Duke

to

University Press, 2004) at 198. Nedelskydraws on scientific approaches to "the natural
world"-for example "genetic mutation" -as constituting a "completely different
context" that nonetheless illuminates the social phenomena she describes. See Nedelsky,
supra narc 93 at 57 . Elsewhere, Ncdclsky describes the networks and behaviours of
material actanrs as intersecting with social relationships, but primarily treats scientific
accounts of these networks and behaviours as sources of useful metaphors for the social
relationships that form her primary area of inquiry: Jennifer Nedelsky, "Relational
Autonomy and the Trap of Social Determinism: Perspectives from Science and
Theology" (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors). \'\'e want to extend
relational theory by suggesting that genetic mutations and other phenomena of the
natural (and synrhetic) world arc nor "completely diffcrcnr", nor simply a source of
metaphor for social relations, but are rather core dimensions of social life
and relationship.
u o See generally Jane Bennett,

Vibrant lvtatter: A Political Ecology qf"Things (Durham:

Duke University Press, 2004). Note that the "material feminist" literature to which we
refer is a distinct field from the Marxist "materialist feminism". Sracy Alaimo and Susan
Hekman explain:
It is important to distinguish what we arc calling 'material fcn1inism' -\vhich is crncrging
primarily from corporeal fon1inism. cnvironn1cnral fcminisn1 , and science srudics-frmn
'111atnialist' fe1ninis1n, which e1nnges fron1, or is synonyn1ous with ~larxist fcn1inisn1 . .Even as

many of tht theorists ofw hat wt art calling 'mattrial fnninism" havt been intluenctd by Marxist
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material feminists writing in this mode are reacting to what they view as an
erasure of the active materiality of our world. 1H The concern is that much
feminist analysis occurs at the level of" culture," "language;' and "discourse;'
working to "foreclose attention to lived, material bodies", as well as the biophysical and ecological environments in which we are immersed and
embedded. 112 Approaches which treat culture as distinct from nature limit
us in that they apply "a framework that situates ... the environment, outside
of human and social interactions".' "

It would overstate the case to suggest that relational theorists have so far
treated social and environmental interactions in completely discrete silos. 114
thwry, post· Marxism, and cultural studios, their dtfinition of 'materiality' is not, or is not
exclusively, Marxist.

Sc:acy Alaimo & Susan Hekman, "Introduction: Emerging Models of Macerialicy in
Feminist Theory" [Alaimo & Hekman, "Introduction"] in Stacy Alaimo & Susan
Hekman, eds, Afateri1d Feminism; (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) 1
[Alaimo & Hekman, l1-ft1teria~ at 18, n 3. There arc commonalities between work in the
material feminist mode and "new materialisms" as well. Jane Hcnncrr elaborates that,

"[i]t is important to follow the trail ofhurnan power to expose social hegemonies (as
historical materialists do). Hur my contention is that there is also public value in

following the scent of a [non-human], thingly power, the material agency of natural
bodies and technological artifacts." Hcnncrr, ;upm note 110 at xiii.
111

See Stacy Alaimo, "Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature" in
Alaimo & Hekman, Af11terial, supm note 110 at 237 [Alaimo, "Trans-Corporeal
Feminisms"]; Nancy 'lba.na, "Viscous Porosity: \Vicnessing Katrina" in Alaimo &

Hekman, Material, supm note 110, 188 at 188.
112

Alaimo & Hekman, "Introduction'; supra note 110, 1 at 1-4. One of the earliest and
most consistent feminist critics of the postmodern trend in feminism has been

Catharine lvfacKinnon. See e.g. ;\facKinnon, «Points Against Postrnodernisrn", (2000)
75 :3 Chicago-Kenc L Rev 687. 'l 'he material feminist literarnre differs from MacKinnon
in its assessment of the usefulness of postmodern analysis. Sec e.g. Alaimo & H ekman,
"Introduccion", supra .note 110 (insisting that the material feminist critique of
postmodernism does not entail "a return to modernism", but rather seeks "a
de construction of the material/discursive dichoromythat re rains both clements wirhour

privileging either'' at 6) .
ll.J

Scott, Haw & Lee, supm note 53 at 11.

11

Sec e.g. Ncdclsky, supra note 93 ("I sec a link between the [dominant conception of a]

'

disembodied subject and one of che most fundamental and neglected relationships, thac
of human beings ro earth and to the other beings who inhabit it with us .... In an
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Existing relational accounts, however, have not seriously engaged with the
ways in which social relationships include, and are mediated through,
physical elements from the micro (chemicals) to the macro (environments,
including toxic environments). Material feminists offer some helpful tools
for such an inquiry, as they begin with the position that, just as individuals
cannot pre-exist their sociality, they cannot pre-exist ecological or material
relationality. As Jane Bennett explains, "[t]his material vitality is me, it
predates me, it exceeds me, it postdates me". 11 5 A body is always "modulating
with its environments". 11 6 The living and the material, subjects and objects,
the social and the natural are always mutually co-constiruting.w
As we have seen in respect to BFRs and phthalates, the very presence
(and the specific concentrations) of these toxics in the environment is
"influenced by social dynamics and technology, and by economic and
political factors favouring the industries that produce and emit them. Thus,
political and social factors have a direct role in the material (i.e., chemical)
composition of the environment, and accordingly, our material bodies".rn
Nancy Tuana, for example, has described how phthalates move from the
PVC manufacturing plants in Louisiana into the flesh of the workers and
nearby residents, demonstrating the ongoing, continual exchange between
material bodies and the environment. 11 " Phthalates are released into air and
leach from PVC plumbing into water; they make their way across
membranes and into bodies, tissues, and cells; and they bind to receptors,
mimicking hormones and triggering metabolic processes. In this way, the

optimal rclarional approach, our place in rhe ecology of earth would be recognized as a
relationship that shapes and is shaped by all others'' at 34).
115

Bennett, supra note 110 at 120.

uG

Milla Tiainen, Karve-Kaisa Komruri & Ilona Hongisto, "framing, rollowing,
J\fiddling: Towards M ethodologies of Relational Materialitics" (2015) 21 :2 Cultural
Studies Rev 14 at 15.

117

See Bennett, supra note 110 (" [a]n actant never really acts alone. Its efficacy or agency
always depends on the collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interference of many
bodies and forces" ar 21).

us See Score, Haw & Lee, supra note 53 ar 332.
11

"

Tuana, supm note 111 at 200.
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escapingphthalate molecules lead to specific, uninvited material changes to
people's bodies with real consequences for their health and well-being, and
that of their possible future children. This would also be true for
BFRs, which typically enter bodies through inadvertent ingestion, as we
gather those molecules under our fingernails from our computers and house
dust, and then put our hands to our mouths. BFRs ultimately collect and
are stored in our fatty tissues. Because they bioaccumulate in the body,
"BFRs can be thought to create a fleshy material archive of one's social
location, practices, and movements. Not only are bodies embedded in
social contexts and structures, but the social is also embedded, literally, in
material bodies".' :o
Accounting for the agentic qualities of matter gives rise to a profound
iteration of a problem at the heart of relational theory: confronting
cosmological and epistemological indeterminacy-and the attendant lack
of "control" over environments and material actors-with "receptivity,
acceptance, attentiveness, and creative responsiveness': rather than defeatism
and nihilism.i:i With reference to the body, Nedelsky notes that"[ w Je did
not create and cannot ultimately control our bodies, just as we did not
create and cannot control the world we live in. Bur we are responsible for
our bodies (and our world)". 122
As the integrity of boundaries between human bodies and the material
world destabilizes, conventional understandings of human agency and
material absence-~fagency come into question.m Liberal theory takes the
individual human person to have agency, while elements of the non-human,

120

Scott, Ha'v & Lee, supra note 53 at 333.

121

Ncdclsky, supra norc 93 at 288.

122

Jhid at 279-80.

123

In much of rhc material feminist lircraturc, the "human" and "non-human" arc
transposed, with no serious attention to where animals fit in to the world they describe.
Animals are, of course, affected by toxics, often in devastating ways. See Valerie Brown,
"Causes for Concern: Chemicals and \'Vildlife", TVorld TVildjireFund (December 2003 ),

online: <d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/ causesforconcern.pdf>. Our
political and legal systems have proven notoriously deficient in protecting animal
interests in this regard, as in others. See generally Bisgould, supra note 43.
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bio-physical, or material world are seen as non-agentic; chey are presumed
to passively follow natural "laws" or be acted upon by humans. 12 ' But
material frminists argue that even matter is not always inert and that human
corporeality continuously interacts with d1e materiality ofd1e environment,
a phenomenon that Stacy Alaimo refers to as "trans-corporeality". 125 Thus,
agency is not thought to be exclusive to human or even living beings, but
must also be applied to the intra-active and reactive, responsive materiality
of things and environments. As Bennett says, "[t]his understanding of
agency does not deny che existence of that thrust called intentionality, buc it
does see it as less definitive of outcomes". 126 Circling back to the relational
theoretical critique of autonomy-as-control in the context of social
relationships, the insights of feminist materialists call upon us to confront
the cask of defining politically desirable autonomy in a world where subjects
are in a state of constant interpenetration with agentic materials that often
seem to defy our immediate perception, lee alone "control".
The idea of a "toxic trespass", for example, posits that synthetic
chemicals now routinely and freely cross bodily boundaries and enter the
cells, tissues, and organs of people living in the industrialized world. 127
Seim tists trying to popularize understandings ofendocrine disruptors often
describe these synthetic chemicals as "messengers" that mimic hormone
action by "moving through the body, picking up 'packages' from the

t 24

Alaimo,'" frans-Corporeal reminisms", supm note 111. The failure co accribme even the
most basic justiciable interests to animals or environments may be seen as flowing from
some version of chis liberal premise. ({Laurence H Tribe, "\X'.tys Nor to Think About
Plastic Trees: N cw Foundations for Environmental Law" ( 1974) 83:7 Yale LJ 1315. For
this reason, some efforts to include animals in the legal category of "persons" have
focused on proving that animals are capable of rdevam forms and degrees of
"autonomy". See e.g. Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rightsjor Animal>
(Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000 ); Steven Wise, Drawing the Line: Sciena; and
the Ciisefi;r Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002).

12
1

s Alaimo, "Ti-ans-Corporeal Feminisms", supra note 111at238.
1

it

Bennett, supra note 110 at 32.

m See Toxic Tre.1pass, 2007, DVD (Ottawa: Nationalhlm Board, 2007); Helen Pearman
Ziral & Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg, "Help! Our Toxic Environment is Killing Our
Children" (2011) 2:1J Motherhood Initiative 102.
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'outside', delivering them to receptive agents [on the 'inside'], igniting and
transforming productive processes". m Othertimes a lock-and-key metaphor
is employed. All three of these images (the trespasser, messenger, and lockand-key) evoke a misleading sense of boundary between body and
environment-albeit a boundary which may be breached. The reality, also
invoked by these same metaphors, is that "bodies are in dynamic
relationships of exchange wid1 environments, and constantly in flux.''m As
Max Liboiron says, synthetic hormones actually "participate in the body's
endocrine, or hormone, system". 1 w In coming to realize that uninvited
changes to our endocrine systems by everyday toxics have "real, tangible,
material consequences for bodies", 131 and corresponding effects on health
and reproduction, it becomes obvious that these exposures could impact
our abilities to work, thrive, reproduce, and choose, now and in the future.
Thus, as much as these synthetic chemical actors might lack intention, and
their precise movements may be unpredictable and beyond anyone's
control, we have to admit that the movements of these "enigmatic, active
Others"rn are conditioning the agency of human actors.
13.

PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURI'l'Y: WELCOMING BODILY DIVERSITY

A core methodological and epistemological imperative supporting
relational theory's more social vision of autonomy is the insistence that
theory and policy must be grounded in dialogue between diverse persons
and groups, each of which brings to bear their own unique perspectives.

128

Dayna Nadine Scott, "Pollution and the Body Boundary: Exploring Scale, Gender and
Remedy" in Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley. eds, Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law

129

Scorr, Haw & Lee, supra nore 53 ar 332.

13 0
'

Max Liboiron, "Plasticizers: A T,venty~ First Century ?vfiasn1a" inJennifet Gabrys, Gay
Hawkins & Mike :i\1ichacl, eds, /lccumulation: The Af11teri11/ Politics 1!(Plastic (New
York: Routledge, 2013) ar 140 Iemphasis added].

ui

Dayna Nadine Scorr, '"Gender-Benders': Sex and Law in the Constitution of Polluted
Bodies" (2009) 17 :3 Fem Leg Srud 241at256 [Scott, "'Gender Benders"'].

102

Cate Sa.ndilands, The Good-Natured Feminist (Minneapolis: University of.Minnesota

(Nnv York: Routledge, 2012) ar 67.

Press, 1999) 181.
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This can encompass Martha Minow's effort to "solici[t J challenges from the
perspective of those labeled different", rn as well as Christine Koggd's call to
foster "genuine interactions, ones in which the dominant and powerful
recognize the validity and value of the different perspectives" ofoppressed
persons. '·;i Rights, values, and social norms are all understood by relational
theorists to be social choices, each of which in turn shapes our
opportunities for autonomous choice across a range of interpersonal and
institutional contexts. m The relational route to justice thus requires that
particular voices-especially chose that have been traditionally overlooked
or marginalized-be included in democratic dialogues regarding the
policies, laws, and rights that shape people's lives and opportunities.
At first blush, this may seem to pose an insurmountable challenge when
applied to persons who do not yet exist, or may never come into being. The
orthodox intergenerational justice literature is replete with references to the
unknowability offuture persons and communities, and the suggestion diac
what is in fact known or knowable about future generations might be
limited only to the "objectively" discernible basic needs of biological
persons.u6 But the relational insight that all perspectives are situated casts
doubt on the prospects for such objectivity and demands more careful
consideration of the tools at our disposal for understanding future persons,
their likely relationships with each other, and with past and contemporary
communities and individuals.
While we may be unable to seek the direct input offuture persons, d1is
does not limit our conceptions of intergenerational justice to bare claims
1
,_;

lvfino\V1 supra note 94 at 112.

u 4 Koggd, supra note 78 ac 193.
13 5
'

Nedd sky, suprd note 93 at 65, 249; Kogge1 supr,t note 78 at 202-03; Min ow, supra note

94 ar 309.
13
"'

l':fBrown \t\/eissJn fairness, supm note 7 ar 39 (positing rhar "[i]r would be difficult, if
nor impossible, ro predict [rhe preferences of future generations], eirher because rheir
values, and hence their preferences. will change over time. or because technological
developments may change the options available to them upon which they will base their
preferences'; thus limi ring inrergenerarional obligations ro a minimal core ofensuring "a
reasonably secure and flexible natural and cultural resource base for future generations
and a reasonably decent and healthy human environm~nt for the present generation:')
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about the objective interests of future persons. Instead, a relational account
of intergenerational justice demands that we solicit diverse past and
contemporary perspectives on futurity, and take these seriously in defining
our obligations to future persons and communities. The term "futurity"
often appears in the intergenerational justice literature without explicit
definition.'·;7 The Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation
offers a spare, apolitical definition:"[ i] n the future, yet to come."rn In other
fields of social discourse, however, the term "futurity" is imbued with the
particular hopes and fears of diverse constituencies, and is deeply
interwoven with social and material forces past and present. Andrew
Baldwin summarizes that "the future is rendered knowable through specific
practices (i.e., calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn,
intervenes on the present through ... anticipatory logics".1'9 He elaborates
that "[f]uturity is also an important feacure of the affective dimensions of
daily life" including"fear" and "hope". 110 On such accounts, what is "[i]n the
future, yet to come" is not an empty signifier of passing hours, days, and
years, but is instead heavy with specific anxieties and expectations relating

u 7 See e.g. Dobson~ supra note I 0.

us Chris Park & MichaelAI!aby, Dictionary o/Environment and Conservation. 3d ed (New
York: Oxford Universiry Press, 201 7), sub verbo "fumriry". C.,]'Gregory Kavka. "The
Futurity Problem" in RI Sikora & Brian Barry, eds, Obligations to Future Generations

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978) 186 ar 187 (using rhe phrase "the
rucuriry Problem" ro describe the abstract question of whether "the interests of future
strangers Iare Jworthy ofequal consideration with chose ofpresently existing strangers?"
[emphasis in the original]).
u 9 Andrew Baldwin, "\Vhiteness and ruturity: 'fowards a Research Agenda" (2012) 36:2
Progress Human Geography 172 at 173, citing Ben Anderson, "l'rccmption, Precaution,
Preparedness: Anticipatory Action and Future Geographies'' (2010) 34:6 Progress
Human Geography 777.
t

4

o Balchvin, supra note 139 at 173, citing Rachel Pain, cc Globalized }eat? 'lOv.rards an
Emotional Geopolitics" (2009) 33:4 Progress in Human Geography 466; Ben
Anderson, "Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect" (2006) 24:5
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 733; Ben Anderson & Adam Holden,
''Affective Urbanism and the Event of Hope" (2008) 11:2 Space & Culture 142.
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to the human and more-than-human world. 141 This more political
understanding of "futurity" has been particularly well developed in the

contexts of settler colonial critique and queer theory, 142 though, as we will
see, it resonates with the broader relational insight that problems and
solutions are best understood through processes of engagement among

diverse constituencies.
The orthodox account of intergenerational justice rarely delves into the
rich literature on "slow violence", harm, and justice over time chat has been
developed by scholars ofenvironmental justice, Third World Approaches to

International Law (TWAIL), and others concerned with the temporal
dimensions of persistent global inequality. 143 Nor does the orthodox
141

See e.g. Katharine Dow's fieldwork on the particular anxieties experienced by
environmental advocates in Spey Bay, Scotland: Katharine Dow. "What Gets Left
Behind for }uture Generations? Reproduction and the Environment in Spey
Bay. Scodand" (2016) 22:3 J Royal Anrhropological lnstimte (NS) 653 at 663,
asserting that:

[i] n ,Spcy Bay, pcopk's primary focus \Vas on cetacean cndangcrn1cnr. bur '\\rhcn we talked n1orc
about how people have children, it became dear that their fears extended to humans, pointing to
an endangered future in which the expected link between gcncrativiry and futurity could

become dcnamrcd. People in Spey Bay connect rcprodunion and children wirh the foture....
l'his suggests a sense that infertility may be a sign ofenvironmental problems as well as harbinger
of endangerment.
142

Sec e.g. Jose Esteban Mufioz, Cruising Utopia: The Then 1wd There r!fQJ1ecr Futurity
(New York: Nnv York University Press, 2009); Eve Tuck & Ruben A
Gaztambide-Fernandez, "Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity'' (2013) 29: I J
Curriculum Theorizing 72.

141

A necessarily partial list includes: Nixon, supra note 50; Carmen G Gonzalez,
"Env.ironmemal Justice and. lnternational Environmental Law" in Shawkat Alam et al,
eds, Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (London: Routledge,

2013) 77; Carmen G Gom.alez, "Bridging the North-South Divide: International
Environmental Law in the Anthropocene" (2015) 32:2 Pace Envd L Rev 407; Sumudu
Ataparm & Carmen G Gonzalez, "The North-South Divide in International
Environmental Law: :haming the Issues" in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International
Environrnmtal Law and the Glohal South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015) l; Karin Mickelson, "Beyond a Politics of d1e Possible? South-North Relations
and Climate Just.ice" (2009) 10:2 Melbourne J Intl L 411; Anna Grear, "Towards
'Climate Justice'? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice:
Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Furnre Law and Policy" (2014)
5:0 J Human Rights & Envt 103; Joyeera Gupta, "Climate Change: A GAP Analysis
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account, or mainstream environmentalist discourse on toxics, confront the
challenges posed by queer theorists to visions of futurity that em brace
"reproductive and heteronormative politics of hope"-let alone queer
theoretical revisions of this critique in light of assisted reproduction. 11 ; A
relational approach to intergenerational justice requires attention to these
voices and perspectives, and more.
A full exposition of diverse perspectives on futurity is necessarily a
massive, ongoing, collective project, and certainly beyond d1e scope of d1is
paper. What we can offer, however, is an example of one significant angle of
vision and discourse that has been left out of the orthodox account of
intergenerational justice, and mainstream conversations about everyday
toxic exposures: critical disability studies. We have chosen critical disability
studies as our central example because it presents a rich conversation on
questions relating to toxics and justice over time that cuts against the grain
of mainstream accounts of toxic exposure, thus offering a glimpse ofwhat is
missing from approaches that treat future persons as a homogenous,
average-able group, whose interests are best discerned with reference to
claimed objectivity. In particular, having set out the very real concerns
posed by exposure to toxic chemicals, critical disability studies scholarship
calls on us to confront evocations of"anomalous bodies" as emblems of a
tragic or dystopian future as constituting a distinct set of harms with their
own distinct intertemporal dimensions. Moreover, critical disability studies
scholarship offers a vision of futurity that is itself hospitable to relational
analysis. The critical disability studies focus on social construction in
particular is deeply attentive to the importance of intersubjective
Based on Third \'{'orld Approaches to International Law" (2010) 53: 1 German YB Intl
L 341; Julia Dehm, "Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice? Interrogating the
International Climate Regime from a T\VAIL Perspective" (2016) 33:3 \X'indsor YB
Access.Just 129; UshaNatarajan, "T\X'AIL and the Environment: The State of Nature,
the Nature of the State, and the Arab Spring" (2012) 14: I Oregon Rev Intl L 177;
Michael M'Gonigle & Louise 'fakeda, 'The Liberal Limits of Environmental Law: A
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relationships over time, especially as contemporary individuals and
communities define "harm" in their imaginings of the long-term
consequences of toxic exposures.
Critical disability studies scholarship begins with the premise that
disability is relational. It does not reside in the minds or bodies of
individuals, but in the natural and built environments that individuals
inhabit: the social institutions, laws, and policies within which they are
embedded and that regulate d1eir daily interactions and encounters; and d1e
"social patterns that exclude or stigmatize particular kinds of bodies, minds
and ways of being." 1• 1 This understanding of disability stands in stark
contrast to the medical model of disability whereby atypical bodies and
minds are regarded as deviant, pathological, defective, and in need of cure,
fixing, rehabilitation, or even elirnination. 146 Disability, understood as a
biological phenomenon, is "the presence of a physical or cognitive
difference that deviates negatively from a 'mundane' norm." 117 Our framing
of disability, like that of a number of critical disability scholars, does not
deny the materiality of the body-the experiences of pain, altered mood, or
living with one limb 118-but suggests that we cannot make sense or
meaning of these qualities or experiences of embodiment outside of the
socio-cultural or medical practices and familial, community, and
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governance relationships that give diem meaning. H9 Stacy Alaimo goes even
further and argues that we also need to attend to how toxic materialityincluding BFRs and phthalates-affects and constitutes disability. 150 Our
bodies are in constant interchange with our environments from the
moment of conception. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson reminds us,
"the changes that occur when body encounters world are what we
call disability." 111
For disability scholar Alison Kafer, " [d ]is ability is experienced in and
through relationships; it does not occur in isolation."m For example,
disability exists in the relationship of being considered outside ofthe norm,
the relationship of being stigmatized, as well as in all ableist encounters. In
these relationships, disability is a form ofdisadvantage or oppression that is
systematically imposed on cop of one's impairment. 15 ' Understanding that
disability is constructed, including through relationships, enables us to
appreciate that disability is "caused by a contemporary social organization
that takes little or no account of people with impairments" 15• and requires
that we look to sources beyond the individual for causes of disablement.
Critical disability scholarship instructs us to see the ways in which disability
is not an ontological reality-a form of individual pathology to be
remedied or prevented-but rather how mind-body differences are
normatively ascribed meaning and value within socio-material contexts.
On this understanding, each of us is potentially disabled (especially in
an ableist world). Indeed, we are all simultaneously abled and disabled
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depending on time, place, and undertaking.As SarahJaqnette Ray explains:
" [aJbility is relative to phase oflife and to society's structural expectations
and physical designs. Accessibility and design are relative to the ableism that
informs their construction." 15s Thus, disability is a dynamic or a
"continuum;'156 "where one is disabled in different spheres of life and to
different degrees." 157
Still, as Eli Clarel 58 and others 119 acknowledge, the recalcitrance of the
body pushes back and invites us to consider the complex relationship
between disability and illness. While disability rights activist, writer, and
wheel chair user, Catherine Frazee is fond of pronouncing: 'Tm the
healthiest person I b10w,''1t•11 Susan Wendell has written, "some unhealthy
disabled people ... experience physical or psychological burdens that no
amount of social justice can eliminate. Therefore, some very much want to
have their bodies cured, not as a substituce for curing ableism, but in
addition to it." 161 This impetus flows, however, not from a desire to bring
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the body or mind in line with imperatives about the normal or proper
body, but from a wish to reduce suffering. Acknowledging these affective,
material, and phenomenological dimensions of the body/ self relationship
permits us to see, contrary to the liberal conception of die autonomous
self, that the subject is never fully determined but provisional and relational,
and in constant dialogue with time, spaces, environments, objects,
and experiences.
Efforts to conceptualize the embodied effects of toxic exposures as
"harms" to present and future persons often rely upon a conception of the
"natural" or the "normal" in characterizing embodied difference. 162 Critical
disability scholars draw our attention to the way in which the conditions
linked to toxic exposures are considered incidents of harm, injury, tragedy,
and degradation caused by the disruption of the natural body and the
natural environment by syn the tic chemicals. 16 ' This imperative to eliminate
disability "defects" expressed in environmental health discourses is
pervasive. Moreover, from the perspective of intergenerational justice, the
impetus to eradicate the harm in the present is perpetuated into the future.
Because, as Kafer explains,"[ t] he presence of disability ... signals ... a future
that bears too many traces of the ills of the present to be desirable ... a
future with disability is a future no one wants". 164 How we think about or
conceptualize disability in the present determines how we envision
disability in the future. And, the common normative view is that "it is the
very absence of disability that signals [a] better future" for us and for our
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progeny. 16 5 Disability is often viewed in mainstream environmental health
discourse as the sign of no future or no good future.
In response to these views, Kafer writes that we need to ensure that
discourses on the "possible impairments linked to toxic exposures do not
replicate ableist language and assumptions." 166 She asks how we can
challenge toxic environments and the use of toxics without relying on the
fear of the "harm" of disability to motivate a public response thereby
perpetuating socially sanctioned accounts of disability fear and attitudes
that disability is a tragedy. In line with Kafer, Clare elaborates on rhe way in
which movements to prevent environmental and toxic degradation mobilize
fears ofcertain kinds ofbodies-minds-those impaired with cancer, asthma,
birth defects (sic) and learning disabilities, for example-to lend support to
their cause. As Clare asserts: "[t]his strategy works because it taps into
ableism." 167 Relying (even implicitly) on notions of disability and chronic
illness as undesirable and tragic conditions in need of cure, prevention, or
elimination, such campaigns perpetuate stereotypical and harmful views
about the guality of life of chose living with body-mind diHerences. In
addition, as Clare argues:
by bluntly leveraging ableism, [such strategies] conflate justice with the
eradication of disability. The price disabled and chronically ill people pay
for this argument is high. It reduces our experiences of breathing, ofliving
wich conditions deemed birth defects, of having cancer, of learning in
many differem ways co proofs ofinjustiee. This reduction frames disability
yet again as damage located entirely within individual body-minds while
disregarding the damage caused by ableism .... It declares us as unnatural as
coal-burning power plants. 1 "'~
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From the point of view of those living with body-mind differences,
proponents of the anti-toxics movement, in working to eliminate or
decrease exposures that may cause disability, are often motivated by fear of
disability. While scientific and research resources are allocated to
investigating the environmental toxic exposures that cause physiological and
morphological mutations that result in disability in current and future
generations, from a disability justice perspective, it is the toxic social
environments, more than toxic chemical environments, that are in fact
harmful to present and future generations of persons with disabilities. We
must think beyond the narrow view of chemical exposures as a cause of
disability, and instead confront the role played by pervasive toxic social
environments that treat disability as a harm requiring prevention or cure.
These socio-toxic environments are related to discrimination, lack of
accommodation, and socio-economic disadvantage for persons with
disabilities

and are

reinforced in the

world of emerging and

increasingly-promoted prenatal screening practices encouraging the
prevention of birth of persons with disabilities. On this view, it is this
socio-toxic environment that is more harmful for persons with disabilities
than the risks of toxic exposures.
From this perspective, it is imperative that research on and
understandings of toxic exposures not conflate environmental injustice and
harms with body-mind difference, and disaggregate the possible results of
exposures to toxic substances that affect the body from the personhowever they are embodied. Moreover, it is essential that researchers and
policy makers do not cast disability as tragedy or harm by regarding persons
with disabilities as the signs of environmental injustice. Such perspectives
efface the ways in which we are all affected by toxics, not just those of us
with visible or diagnosed "abnormalities" or harms. 11' 9
In assessing the potential harms of everyday toxics such as BFRs and
phthalates, critical disability studies scholars insist that we cannot rely upon
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normative conceptions of the body in assessing che effects of toxics on
embodied difference. While toxic exposures may affect embodied variation,
they do not create it; human bodies are already highly variable. Clare uses
the example of monocultures to advance arguments regarding the dangers
of imperatives cowards removing difference from our non-human and
human worlds. Monocultures are "ecosystems that have been stripped,
through human intervention, of a multitude of interdependent beings and
replaced by a single species." 170 It is only through persistent effort, force,
extractions, and purging that monoculmres are created and sustained: "a
world of damage lies beneath the obvious sameness."171 Clare goes further to
worry that the eradication of difference toward monoculture is a pattern
that has been, and continues to be, pervasive over time. He writes that
"[t]he un-choosing of disability fits into this pattern, one force among
many, threatening to create a human monoculcure."n Practices ofgenocide,
incarceration, involuntary sterilization, and colonization have all led to
socially created and enforced monoculcures. In emphasizing the potential
harms of toxic chemicals, we are cognizant chat a monoculture emphasis
leads some people to believe that diversity is a harm. Monocultures are
often toxic for che environment and for human societies, be chey biological
or social. This emphasis on monoculture leads Clare to ask: "How do we
witness, name, and resist the injustices that reshape and damage all kinds of
body-minds-plant and animal, organic and inorganic, nonhuman and
human-while not equating disability with injustice?"m
Building on the insights of queer ecology scholars, critical disability
studies proposes that our conception ofpotential harm needs to rest not on
an appeal to ideas of a normal or normative body, but rather on a "more
proactive (rather than polluted) politics that argues for the integrity,
security, and health of bodies, homes, families, and communities without
1711
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reproducing the eugenics discourse of the "normal/natural"". 171 As Dayna
Nadine Scott observes in her study of toxic exposure on the Aamjiwnaang
reserve, advocacy strategies might seek to "find harm where there is illness
and suffering, but not simply where there is diflerence." 175 This approach
promotes increased capacity for action as a criterion for intergenerational
justice, not continued "conformity with existing categories of life." 176 As
Michelle Murphy explains, "[e]pigenetic and toxicological ways of
investigating [toxic] exposures render legible (and erase) the violence of
industrial chemicals by tracking damage in bodies". 177 But as Murphy notes,
following Eve Tuck, in collecting and drawing attention to "the data of
damage '', the environmental health community becomes "entangled in the
surveillance and pathologization" ofvarious people and communities, now
and in the foture.m Thus, while we do not want to ignore the ways in which
today's inequities matter to questions ofintergenerational justice, we also do
not want to allow theories of epigenetic inheritance, as an example, to
reinscribe race or (dis)ability as inherited pathologies. 179 We want to
preserve space to imagine what Murphy calls "alter-relations": a continuous
capacity to generate new, alternative relations and futurities.
Because we cannot know in advance what the differences of the future
will look like, an ethic and politics of openness is required to respond to the
Giovanna Di Chiro, "Polluted Politics? Confronting Toxic Discourses, Sex Panic and
Eco-Normacivicy" in Cacriona Mortimer-Sandilands & Bruce Erickson, eds, Queer
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approach of treating generations as aggregable and average-able units
that bear and benefit from obligations as a group. In the face of uncertainty
and uncontrollability-and in the face of what we do know about the
endurance and transformation of social and embodied difference over
time-we propose that a more relational approach to intergenerational
justice is needed.
In addition to our ignorance about the interests and aspirations of
future persons, we are also faced with enduring uncertainties as to the
nature of our future world, and thus a certain unknowability vis-a-vis the
effects that our conduct today might produce in the future. In the context
of everyday toxics, this uncertainty is particularly acute since scientific
evidence of the above-described effects of exposure is not yet (and possibly
never will be) conclusive. 184 We do, however, have some clues as to certain
social dimensions of the eftects that might be associated with exposure to
everyday toxics. While toxicologists, endocrinologists, and epidemiologists
continue to discover and debate the mechanisms through which effects
occur, other researchers, as demonstrated, have been charting patterns of
human exposure across demographic groups. Their findings suggest that the
effects of exposures to everyday toxics will be felt unevenly across diverse
social constituencies, likely along familiar social gradients of race, class,
gender, disability, and socio-economic status. Thus, given the deeply social
nature of toxic exposures and effects, we argue that any legal theory capable
ofgrounding meaningful policy prescriptions in this area must be attentive
to the complex matrix of social, ecological, and material relations that
shapes and constrains autonomy in this regard.
This matrix, where embodied human subjects are not just embedded in
a set of personal and structural social relations, but are also immersed
ecologically in a material world beyond their control, can further condition
the agencies and capacities of people. Our analysis produces two insights:
( 1) an acknowledgement that the vast uncertainty in the nature and
trajectory of that relationship is reason for humility, but not defeatism; and
(2) an insistence that any valid conception ofjustice for "future generations"
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moreover, address the imperative to reorient our economic and political
systems, which seem bound in cycles of production and consumption that
threaten vulnerable persons (present and future) and ecological systems. m
This would likely involve deep structural revisions to political and
economic processes that often leave those bearing the most bodily risk with
the least decisional power over capital, industrial, and chemical f1owsY 8
With the Standing Committee's recent recommendation co create an
advocate for future generations, Canada may become one of the
jurisdictions to respond to the calls oftheorists who advocate for procedural
mechanisms designed to bring the interests of future persons into
contemporary policy debates. 1s9 As Canada and other jurisdictions consider
how best to instantiate our obligations to future persons, we urge a
relational approach to intergenerational justice-one that takes social
scruccures and relations seriously, confronts the challenges posed by material
actants, and avoids claims to objective or unsituated perspectives in
describing desirable approaches to futurity. 1;m Instead of adopting a purely
educative or advocacy focus, public bodies tasked with intergenerational
justice ought to include a focus on broad public consultation.19 1
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Technocratic expertise cannot be seen as a substitute for ongoing public
consultation and participation. 192 As the body of critical disabilities
scholarship illustrates, there are no objective answers to questions about
what counts as "harm", what should be done about it, or how these
determinations may impact present and future persons. Instead, the exercise
of looking forward through time is inevitably shaped by relationships.
Relational institutional and policy approaches must acknowledge that deep
uncertainties about the future are moderated by the knowledge that
contemporary inequalities will be infused, one way or anod1er, into future
persons and communities-into their physical environments, their social
worlds, and in their very flesh.
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